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CRIMINAL LAW
I. REQUIREMENT THAT MURDER DEFENDANT MUST PROVE SELF-
DEFENSE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE DID NOT VIOLATE
DUE PROCESS
In Smart v. Leekel the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a South Carolina trial court did not violate the due process clause
when it shifted the burden of persuasion and required a defendant
charged with murder to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. No states in the Fourth Circuit currently shift the burden of
persuasion to defendants in this way. The South Carolina Supreme
Court did not relieve defendants of this burden, however, until after
Ronald Smart's conviction.2 Nevertheless, Smart presents an opportu-
nity to analyze the parameters of federal due process when a state
shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant in homicide cases.
3
In 1981 a jury in the Lexington County General Sessions Court
convicted Ronald Smart for the murder of two men. Smart asserted
that he killed the men in self-defense. At the close of Smart's trial, the
court instructed the jury that the state had the duty to prove every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also
charged the jury that Smart had to prove self-defense by a preponder-
ance of the evidence because it is an affirmative defense.4 The jury con-
victed Ronald Smart and found that the murders took place during the
commission of larceny with a deadly weapon. Consequently, the court
sentenced Smart to death on the jury's recommendation.
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court,, Smart conceded
that the trial court's jury instruction concerning self-defense con-
formed to existing South Carolina law. Nevertheless, he requested and
was denied the opportunity to argue against precedent. The supreme
1. 873 F.2d 1558 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 189 (1989).
2. South Carolina was the last state within the Fourth Circuit to relieve defend-
ants of this burden. See State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984) (jury charge
on self-defense).
3. The discussion of the burden of proof in this survey will distinguish between
the burden of persuasion and the burden of production. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 695 n.20 (1975) (discussion of distinction between the burden of producing
some probative evidence on a particular issue and the burden of persuading the fact
finder on that issue by a standard of proof such as preponderance of the evidence).
4. 873 F.2d at 1559.
5. State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E.2d 686 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088
(1983).
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court upheld his conviction, vacated his death sentence on other
grounds, and remanded the case for a new trial.' At Smart's resentenc-
ing, he received two consecutive life terms.
Smart petitioned the United States District Court for a writ of
habeas corpus. He claimed that by shifting to him the burden of per-
suasion on the issue of self-defense, the trial court had unconstitution-
ally required him to disprove malice, which is an element of the state's
case, "thereby relieving the State of its constitutional duty to prove
each element of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt."' The
district court granted habeas relief and the state appealed.8
The Fourth Circuit, relying primarily on Martin v. Ohio,9 reversed
the district court's order. 10 In Martin the Supreme Court held that
Ohio did not violate due process when it shifted the burden of persua-
sion, as in Smart, and required a defendant to prove self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. The Fourth Circuit concluded that
Smart and Martin were "fundamentally indistinguishable." '11 The
court also distinguished between cases in which a defendant must re-
but a presumption that is part of the state's case12 and cases in which a
defendant asserts an affirmative defense.13 The court indicated that re-
quiring a defendant to rebut a presumption violates due process, but
shifting the burden of persuasion on an affirmative defense does not
violate due process. 4
A review of Supreme Court decisions that discuss shifting the bur-
den of proof reveals a flaw in the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Smart.
In re Winship,"5 one of the Supreme Court's leading decisions on the
requirements of due process, held that "the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
6. Id. at 517, 299 S.E.2d at 687.
7. Smart v. Leeke, 677 F. Supp. 414, 415 (D.S.C. 1987), rev'd, 873 F.2d 1558 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 189 (1989).
8. Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558, 1559 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 189
(1989).
9. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
10. Smart, 873 F.2d at 1563-65.
11. Id. at 1563.
12. E.g. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). In Mullaney the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a Maine law that required a defendant charged with
murder to rebut a presumption of malice. The Fourth Circuit decided in Smart that
Mullaney, as a presumption case, did not support Smart's due process claim. Smart, 873
F.2d at 1562.
13. Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558, 1562 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 189
(1989).
14. See id. at 1562-63.
15. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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which he is charged. ' 6 This absolute standard has been considered in
several cases with facts similar to Smart.
In Mullaney v. Wilbur1 7 the Supreme Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of a Maine law that required a defendant charged with
murder to rebut a presumption of malice. In Mullaney the trial court
had instructed the jury that "if the prosecution established that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was
to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation."118 The court's instruction shifted to the defendant
the burden of persuasion to rebut a presumption of malice in order to
reduce his offense from murder to manslaughter.
Although the Supreme Court agreed with the State of Maine that
it is permissible for a state to establish different levels of unlawful
homicide, the Court held that "[b]y drawing this distinction, while re-
fusing to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests
found critical in Winship."'9 The Court then explicitly held that due
process required "the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation [in effect, the
existence of malice] when the issue is properly presented in a homicide
case."20
A comparison of Mullaney with Patterson v. New York21 reveals
the importance of malice as an element of murder. In Patterson the
appellant claimed that his due process rights had been violated when
the state required him to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Patterson
had been charged with second-degree murder.22 Although a defendant
may need to show an absence of malice to establish extreme emotional
disturbance, the Supreme Court specifically noted that "[m]alice afore-
thought is not an element of the crime [under New York law]. 23 Con-
16. Id. at 364.
17. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
18. Id. at 686. Maine defined murder as an unlawful killing "with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964) (repealed
1976). Maine defined manslaughter as an unlawful killing "in the heat of passion, on
sudden provocation without express or implied malice aforethought." ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2551 (1961) (repealed 1976).
19. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.
20. Id. at 704.
21. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
22. New York defines second-degree murder as "intent to cause the death of an-
other person, [which] causes the death of such person or of a third person." N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
23. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198. Justice Powell, the author of the Mullaney opinion,
1990]
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sequently, the court held that the affirmative defense of extreme emo-
tional disturbance does "not serve -to negative any facts of the crime
which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder. '24
An analysis of Martin v. Ohio,25 the decision on which the Fourth
Circuit relied in Smart v. Leeke, reveals a fact situation similar to Pat-
terson. In Martin the petitioner plead self-defense to a charge of ag-
gravated murder e.2  Although the petitioner conceded that every ele-
ment of the crime existed,27 she claimed that the trial judge's jury
instructions, which shifted to her the burden of persuasion to establish
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, violated the due pro-
cess clause. 28 As in Patterson, however, malice was not an element of
Ohio's statutory definition of murder. Therefore, the Supreme Court
said that "Ohio does not shift to the defendant the burden of disprov-
ing any element of the state's case.
'29
A discussion of these Supreme Court cases casts doubt on the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Martin v. Ohio and Smart v. Leeke
are "fundamentally indistinguishable." 30 The facts of Smart are distin-
guishable from Martin and actually more closely resemble the facts of
Mullaney v. Wilbur. South Carolina defines murder as "the killing of
any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied." 31 The
South Carolina Supreme Court has held that "Malice is an essential
ingredient of murder. ' 32 Furthermore, although the supreme court de-
fines malice as a wrongful act done intentionally without legal justifica-
tion or excuse, self-defense, by definition, is a legal justification or ex-
cuse.3 3 Therefore, when the Fourth Circuit required Smart to bear the
burden of persuasion to establish the existence of self-defense (legal
justification or excuse) by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
dissented in Patterson because New York's statutory defense of extreme emotional dis-
turbance originated from the common law defense of "heat of passion." Powell believed
that New York's shifting of the burden of persuasion was essentially the same as Maine's
requirement in Mullaney, despite the presence of malice as an element of the crime
under Maine law. See id. at 216-32.
24. Id. at 206-07.
25. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
26. Ohio defines aggravated murder as "purposely, and with prior calculation and
design, caus[ing] the death of another." OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Anderson 1982).
27. Martin, 480 U.S. at 231.
28. Id. An Ohio statute required the judge to give these instructions. See OHIO REv.
CoD ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Anderson 1982).
29. Martin, 480 U.S. at 234.
30. Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558, 1563 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 189
(1989).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
32. State v. Harvey, 220 S.C. 506, 514, 68 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1951).
33. See State v. Fuller, 229 S.C. 439, 444-46, 93 S.E.2d 463, 466-67 (1956); State v.
Foster, 66 S.C. 469, 475-76, 45 S.E. 1, 3-4 (1903).
[Vol. 42
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required him to disprove malice (the absence of legal justification or
excuse) which is an essential element of murder.3 4 The Supreme Court
found this exact situation impermissible in Mullaney v. Wilbur.
The Fourth Circuit indicated that the jury was free to consider the
self-defense evidence "in deciding whether there was a reasonable
doubt about the sufficiency of the State's proof of the elements of the
crime. '3 5 The court, however, again relied on Martin v. Ohio. Unfortu-
nately, allowing the jury to consider self-defense evidence, as in Mar-
tin, does not reconcile the difference between the definitions of murder
in the two cases. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated in Engle v.
Isaac3s that "the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate affirma-
tive defenses may depend, at least in part, on the manner in which the
State defines the charged crime. '37 Consequently, Martin should not
have controlled the Fourth Circuit's decision in Smart v. Leeke.
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the distinction between "pre-
sumption" and "affirmative defense" cases 38 is as interesting as the
court's determination that Smart and Martin are indistinguishable
cases. The court said that in presumption cases "the state is improp-
erly relieved of the burden of proving an essential element of the crime
charged, and the burden is unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant
to disprove the element."13 The court, however, indicated that no con-
stitutional violation occurs when the burden of persuasion is shifted to
34. The district court's jury instructions present a corollary question: whether the
instructions themselves violated Smart's due process rights because they were so confus-
ing that the jury could not reconcile them. The court instructed the jury that the state
must prove every element of its case, which included malice, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court also instructed the jury that the defendant must prove self-defense, which
included absence of malice, by a preponderance of evidence. This is precisely the intel-
lectual conflict that, the Fourth Circuit held unconstitutional in Thomas v. Leeke, 725
F.2d 246 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984). The court stated that, "Confusion
in the minds of the jury was inescapable with a charge that was unequivocally contradic-
tory.. . . In the face of such conflicting instructions, the jury's compliance with one part
of the instructions necessarily led to its disregard of another part." Id. at 251.
In granting habeas relief to Smart the district court ruled that the jury's instructions
were as constitutionally deficient as those in Thomas v. Leeke. Smart v. Leeke, 677 F.
Supp. 414, 423 (D.S.C. 1987), rev'd, 873 F.2d 1558 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 189
(1989). The Fourth Circuit disposed of the issue, however, by stating that "under Martin
v. Ohio the instruction would no longer be considered unclear and misleading." Smart v.
Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558, 1565 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 189
(1989).
35. Smart, 873 F.2d at 1564.
36. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
37. Id. at 120.
38. See Smart, 873 F.2d at 1561-62.
39. Id. at 1562.
1990]
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the defendant to establish an affirmative defense.40
South Carolina, however, can retain malice as an element of mur-
der, and still not require the prosecutor to disprove, without violating
due process, every possible defense as an element of its case. As the
dissent in Smart suggests, the defendant can be assigned the burden of
production to adduce evidence of self-defense. The burden would then
shift back to the state to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
41
The South Carolina Supreme Court impliedly adopted this ap-
proach in State v. Davis.42 Furthermore, the supreme court clearly
adopted this rule in State v. Bellamy when it held that, "It is clear
that the defendant need not establish self-defense by a preponderance
of the evidence but must merely produce evidence which causes the
jury to have a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt."' 3 Accordingly, this
due process issue should no longer arise in South Carolina.
Michael V. Hammond
II. PRIOR BAD ACTS THAT SHOW COMMON ScHEME ARE ADMISSIBLE
AGAINST CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
In State v. Hallman44 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that evidence of prior bad acts is admissible in a criminal trial if the
prior acts are "closely similar" to the charged offense. Additionally, in
Hallman the court held that the defendant's prior bad acts bore such a
"close similarity" and show such a common scheme to the charged of-
fense that the probative value of the act clearly outweighed its prejudi-
cial effects.
40
Morgan Hallman was charged with criminal sexual assault and at-
tempting to commit a lewd act with a minor foster child in Hallman's
home.46 At trial the state introduced testimony of other minors who
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1568.
42. 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984). In Davis the South Carolina Supreme Court
established a model jury instruction for a self-defense charge. After summarizing the
elements of the defense, the court concluded: "if you have a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence including the evidence of self-defense,
then you must find him not guilty." Id. at 46, 317 S.E.2d at 453.
43. 293 S.C. 103, 105, 359 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1987).
44. 298 S.C. 172, 379 S.E.2d 115 (1989).
45. Id. at 175, 379 S.E,2d at 117. Hallman had been convicted of first degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct with a minor. The court noted that the testimony of other. children
describing Hallman's prior sexual acts showed that the abuse "commenced ... in ex-
actly the same manner under similar circumstances." Id.
46. Id. at 173, 379 S.E.2d at 116.
[Vol. 42
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alleged that similar assaults occurred in the past when they were foster
chidlren in the Hallman home. Although Hallman was not on trial for
these alleged previous assaults and had never been charged or con-
victed for the prior assaults, the trial court allowed the minors to tes-
tify about the manner and frequency of Hallman's prior assaults.4 '
Traditionally, evidence of prior bad acts was not admissible to
prove the charged offense or to show the character of the accused, but
since 1923 South Carolina has recognized five exceptions to this rule.'
Specifically, in State v. Lyle"9 the South Carolina Supreme Court
stated:
[E]vidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime
charged when it tends to establish, (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the ab-
sence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing
the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that
proof of one tends to establish the others; [or] (5) the identity of the
person charged .... 11
Since the Lyle opinion, South Carolina courts generally have admitted
evidence of prior bad acts if the evidence fits one of the five excep-
tions."' The Federal Rules of Evidence include a large number of ex-
ceptions which allow the admission of evidence of prior bad acts, 2 but
South Carolina does not have any statutory authority that pertains to
prior bad acts. The common law limits South Carolina to the five ex-
ceptions carved out in Lyle.
In Hallman the supreme court allowed the testimony into evi-
dence under the common scheme exception, stating:
Evidence of a common scheme or plan is admissible if it embraces two
or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
47. Id. at 173-75, 379 S.E.2d at 116-17. The victim in this case testified that the
abuse started shortly after she arrived in the Hallman home. She was between seven and
nine years old. Both witnesses testified that the appellant began to assault them shortly
after they arrived in the foster home, and the witnesses claimed that the assaults oc-
curred in the same manner as the victim's assault. See id.
48. See Reiser, Evidence of Other Criminal Acts in South Carolina, 28 S.C.L. REv.
125 (1976).
49. 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
50. Id. at 416, 118 S.E. at 807.
51. See generally State v. McClellan, 283 S.C. 389, 392, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1984)
(court allowed evidence of prior sexual assaults committed on sisters in a nearly identical
manner); see also Reiser, supra note 48.
52. FED. R. Evm. 404(b). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
See also W. REISER, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH CAR-
OLINA EVIDENCE LAW 13 (3d ed. 1987).
1990]
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establish the others. The prior bad acts here occurred while each of
the young women was a foster child to appellant and of similar age to
the victim. In each instance, appellant took advantage of this relation-
ship for his sexual gratification. . . . [The abuse] commenced . . . in
exactly the same manner under similar circumstances."3
Similarly, in State v. McClellan54 two sisters testified against their fa-
ther about prior sexual assaults. The testimony was admitted against
the father who was charged with a similar assault on a third sister. The
McClellan court applied the common scheme exception because "[t]he
experiences of each daughter parallel that of her sisters . . .55
The supreme court, however, has refused to apply the common
scheme exception in several cases. In State v. Rivers5" the court disal-
lowed testimony of the defendant's wife about her husband's sexual
practices that were similar to the rape with which he had been
charged. The court stated "the overwhelming result of admitting un-
connected sexual relationships is to establish an accused's character or
propensity to engage in the alleged sexual conduct as a basis for infer-
ring that he committed the charged crime. ' 57 Furthermore, in State v.
Wilson 8 testimony of similar sexual acts was not allowed under the
common scheme exception because three months had elapsed between
the similar sexual acts and the alleged offenses. Finally, in State v.
Rogers 9 a sister's testimony of a prior sexual assault was not admissi-
ble under a common scheme exception because "the acts were ten
years apart and the only connection between the testimony of the two
daughters was appellant touched them both."60
In Hallman, however, the court noted that the assaults com-
menced in "exactly the same manner," that each of the victims was a
foster child and was approximately the same age when the assaults oc-
curred.6 1 Thus, for prior sexual assaults to qualify under the common
scheme exception, the separate acts must bear more than a similarity.
Although evidence of prior bad acts is admissible under the Lyle
exceptions, the standard for admitting this evidence is not clear.62 In
State v. Drew63 the court held that in order to be admissible "evidence
53. Hallman, 298 S.C. at 175, 379 S.E.2d at 117 (citation omitted).
54. 283 S.C. 389, 323 S.E.2d 772 (1984).
55. Id. at 392, 323 S.E.2d at 774.
56. 273 S.C. 75, 254 S.E.2d 299 (1979).
57. Id. at 78, 254 S.E.2d at 300 (citation omitted).
58. 274 S.C. 635, 266 S.E.2d 426 (1980).
59. 293 S.C. 505, 362 S.E.2d 7 (1987).
60. Id. at 507, 362 S.E.2d at 8.
61. See Hallman, 298 S.C. at 175, 379 S.E.2d at 117.
62. See W. REISER, supra note 52, at 13.
63. 281 S.C. 440, 316 S.E.2d 367 (1984).
[Vol. 42
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of prior crimes should rest upon actual convictions ... .""e Moreover,
in State v. DuBose65 the court held that "proof of the other crimes
must be clear and convincing."' 6
State v. Hallman reaffirms South Carolina's willingness to allow
testimony of prior bad acts despite the potential for prejudice and the
opinion is consistent with the court's opinion in State v. Lyle.6e The
Hallman court, however, eased the standard for admission of prior bad
acts so that a testimony about the prior bad acts of a criminal defend-
ant can be admitted even though the defendant has not been charged
or convicted of any previous crime.
Anthony L. Harbin
III. AFFIDAVIT CAN REScUE WARRANT REGARDING PROPERTY THAT Is
SEIZED
In State v. Williams 8 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that certain language in an affidavit, which accompanies a search war-
rant, can satisfy the statutory and constitutional particularity require-
ments for the search warrant with regard to the property to be seized.
Thus, if the court can determine the property to be seized with suffi-
cient particularity from the descriptions on the affidavit and the search
warrant, then the warrant is constitutionally and statutorily sufficient,
and the evidence subsequently seized pursuant to the warrant will not
be suppressed. 9
In Williams a county sheriff's department sought a search warrant
after an investigator saw many persons briefly visit Freddie Williams'
mobile home,"0 and after the department received a report from a con-
fidential informant. To secure the warrant, the department submitted
an affidavit that described the property it sought to obtain as "'any
illegal drugs.' ,,71 After the magistrate spoke with the chief deputy
sheriff on the telephone, 2 an investigator provided the affidavit to the
magistrate who issued the warr'ant.73 The warrant, however, errone-
ously identified the property to be seized as the suspect's residence and
64. Id. at 441-42, 316 S.E.2d at 368.
65. 288 S.C. 226, 341 S.E.2d 785 (1986).
66. Id. at 230, 341 S.E.2d at 787.
67. 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
68. 297 S.C. 404, 377 S.E.2d 308 (1989).
69. Id. at 407-08, 377 S.E.2d at 310.
70. Record at 49-50.
71. 297 S.C. at 406, 377 S.E.2d at 309.
72.. Record at 51.
73. Id. at 25.
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not the contraband.7 4
South Carolina Code section 17-30-140, which governs the issuance
and execution of search warrants, provides that if a magistrate deter-
mines that probable cause exists, "he shall issue a warrant identifying
the property and naming or describing the person or place to be
searched.17 5 Without the affidavit the warrant in Williams would have
been statutorily deficient because it did nbt identify the property to be
seized by the sheriff's department.
In Williams the supreme court relied on State v. Ellis,76 another
drug search and seizure case, to reach its decision. In Ellis the South
Carolina Supreme Court read together the search warrant and the po-
lice officer's affidavit in order to meet the particularity requirement
with regard to the place to be searched and held that the warrant was
sufficient. The court in Williams, therefore, moderately extended ex-
isting South Carolina case law.
The court's decision to allow the warrant and affidavit to be read
together is reasonable in light of the purposes of the warrant and the
practice in South Carolina of simultaneously serving the two docu-
ments. The warrant facilitates the process of keeping records and pro-
vides notice to the individual whose person or property is to be
searched.7 1 Although the limitations on the search are listed on two
documents rather than one, the warrant and the affidavit do not pro-
vide any less notice to the accused when an officer serves him with
both documents. Moreover, the recordkeeping function is not adversely
effected because the warrant and affidavit are on the same piece of
paper.
Other courts also read the warrant and affidavit together. In a case
similar to Williams the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an affidavit which cites "illegal drugs" as the object of the search
is sufficient to rescue a warrant that erroneously lists a description of
an automobile as the evidence the searchers expected to find.7 8 Al-
though decisions in other courts are also consistent with Williams,79
some courts have expressed strong0 or qualified 8' disagreement with
74. Id. at 102.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
76. 263 S.C. 12, 207 S.E.2d 408 (1974).
77. See State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 565 n.10, 216 S.E.2d 501, 513 n.10 (1975).
78. See State v. Meyers, 520 So. 2d 842, 846-48 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
79. See, e.g., State v. Moorman, 154 Ariz. 578, 583, 744 P.2d 679, 683-84 (1987)
(warrant had no description of item to be seized, but was rescued by affidavit because
executing officer had it with him and referred to it).
80. See, e.g., Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 564-65 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (warrant
must specify incorporation because allowing extrinsic documents to be incorporated by
implication into a warrant would deny a constitutional imperative).
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its position. The opinions contrary to Williams, however, appear out of
harmony with the flexible totality-of-the-circumstances approach ar-
ticulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.
8 2
The Williams court also discussed the adequacy of the magis-
trate's probable cause determination when he issued the warrant. The
affidavit's probable cause recitation stated that the information came
"from a reliable informant that has given information to the Sheriff's
Dept. that has been true and has led to arrest and convictions in the
past and has seen drugs at this residence in the past 72 hours.""3 The
court upheld the magistrate's determination on two bases: (1) the
court's substantial deference to magistrates' probable cause determina-
tions, and (2) the totality-of-the-circumstances test articulated in Illi-
nois v. Gates."'
The probable cause requirement interposes a neutral and detached
magistrate between the police and the citizenry.8 5 The "neutral and
detached" intermediary function has not perhaps been fulfilled in Wil-
liams to the extent that might be desired. The police certainly could
have given the magistrate more information to establish probable
cause. The affidavit mentioned only the informant's information, but
the record reflects that the police did not include in the affidavit the
results of their extended surveillance of Williams' mobile home."8 The
police, for example, knew whether the informant was under indict-
ment,8 7 and that the investigator had known the informant for a long
81. United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 965, 982 (D. Mass. 1988) (sufficient
particularity exists only if warrant expressly incorporates and is attached to the
affidavit).
82. 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).
83. Record at 108.
84. Williams, 297 S.C. at 405-06, 377 S.E.2d at 309; State v. Crane, 296 S.C. 336,
339, 372 S.E.2d 587, 588-89 (1988); State v. Pressley, 288 S.C. 128, 130-31, 341 S.E.2d
626, 627-28 (1986).
85. See Moyland, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer,
25 MERCER L. RE V. 741, 742 (1974). Moylan, an Associate Judge of the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals explained it as follows:
The clear and unremitting command of the Supreme Court throughout this
century has been that search and seizure by authority of a warrant is always to
be preferred over a warrantless intrusion, and indeed, wherever feasible is to
be required. Implicit in that command is the concept that any decision as to
whether probable cause exists so that a warrant should issue should always be
made where possible, by a 'neutral and detached magistrate' rather than by a
policeman. The constitutional protection consists of interposing an impartial
judicial figure between the investigator and his quarry.
Id. (footnote omitted).
86. Record at 49-50.
87. Id. at 26.
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time.8 Furthermore, the police knew that several people had tele-
phoned about Williams' activities.8 9 Thus, the police could have made
a much stronger showing of probable cause to the magistrate if they
had been called upon to do so.
Some of the additional information may have been provided in the
telephone conversation between the magistrate and the chief deputy
sheriff before the warrant issued,90 but this possibility does not appear
to have been pursued at trial.
Even so, supplementing the warrant by additional information is
inconsistent with the law. Sworn oral testimony, though insufficient
alone, may supplement an affidavit in South Carolina,9 1 but, no provi-
sion in South Carolina law, however allows a telephone conversation
either to supplement or to be the basis for issuing a warrant. The
South Carolina Code precludes that possibility in section 17-13-140,
which states that: "A warrant issued hereunder shall be issued only
upon affidavit sworn to before the magistrate .... "" Furthermore,
South Carolina courts have forbidden law enforcement officials to sup-
plement a warrant by telephone . 3 By contrast, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure allow application for a warrant to be made by tele-
phone 4 rather than in person. If the legislature would adopt a proce-
dure similar to the federal practice, better documentation and control
over the telephone contacts between law enforcement officials and
magistrates regarding warrants would result. Formalizing these con-
tacts also might make it more likely that magistrates will remain de-
tached and neutral intermediaries. Given the relaxed requirements of
Williams, however, the police only infrequently will need to provide
supplementary information. In State v. Williams the South Carolina
Supreme court justifiably reaffirmed the commonsense, flexible proce-
dural philosophy of Gates. The circumstances of the case, however,
raise some doubts about whether magistrates are serving as neutral in-
termediaries, and the court may need to emphasize this in the future.
William R. Calhoun, Jr.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 27-28.
90. Id. at 21, 51.
91. State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 113, 352 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1987).
92. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 17-13-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
93. See McKnight, 291 S.C. at 113, 352 S.E.2d at 472. The court in McKnight
stated that, "A search warrant affidavit which itself is insufficient to establish probable
cause may be supplemented before the magistrate by sworn oral testimony." Id. (empha-
sis in original).
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
[Vol. 42
12
South arolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss1/6
CRIMINAL LAW
IV. Strickland TEST IGNORED IN FINDING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
In Mitchell v. State95 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
an attorney's failure to object to impermissible character evidence con-
stituted ineffective assistance of counsel and, thus, violated the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 8 The court based its decision
on the circumstantial nature of the state's evidence, which led the jury
to place primary importance on the defendant's credibility.97 In ruling
that the defendant did not have effective assistance of counsel, the su-
preme court did not apply the United States Supreme Court's two-
prong test to determine ineffectiveness indentified in Strickland v.
Washington.98 The Strickland test requires a defendant to show first
"that counsel's performance was deficient . . . . [by] showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense." 9
A grand jury indicted Addie Mitchell for the murder of her hus-
band, assault and battery with intent to kill her husband's lover, and
burglary. The evidence introduced against Mitchell at trial was entirely
circumstantial. The state presented no direct evidence that linked
Mitchell to the crimes.
100
During the trial the state introduced extensive evidence that im-
pugned Mitchell's character. The evidence consisted of testimony by a
police officer and a witness, Thelma Ford, that Mitchell's home con-
tained an altar surrounded by devil candles and burned snapshots.10'
Other testimony characterized Mitchell as a root doctor, a spiritual ad-
visor, and a spell-caster.' 0 Finally, Mitchell's son testified that his
mother was a member of the Mafia. 03 Mitchell's attorney did not ob-
ject to the introduction of this character evidence.'10 The jury subse-
quently found Mitchell guilty on all charges. Mitchell sought post-con-
viction relief and asserted ineffective assistance of counsel because of
95. 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123 (1989) (per cpriam).
96. See id. at 188-89, 379 S.E.2d at 124-25.
97. Id. at 189, 379 S.E.2d at 125.
98. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
99. Id. at 687.
100. Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 187, 189, 379 S.E.2d 123, 124-25 (1989) (per
curiam).
101. Brief of Appellant at 21.
102. Id. at 23-24.
103. Mitchell, 298 S.C. at 188, 379 S.E.2d at 125.
104. Id. at 189, 379 S.E.2d at 125.
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her attorney's failure to object to the evidence of prior bad acts. The
South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari after Mitchell's ap-
plication was denied for post-conviction relief. 05
The supreme court determined that counsel's failure to object to
the character evidence constituted ineffectiveness of counsel for two
reasons. First, "the State cannot attack the character of the defendant
unless the defendant herself first places her character in issue."10 Sec-
ond, "evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to show criminal pro-
pensity or to-demonstrate that the accused is a bad person"107
The court then focused on the effects of counsel's error on the trial
itself. Citing Strickldnd, the court addressed the question whether
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's. . . errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different."'1 8 The court
that determined "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine the confidence in the outcome." 0 9 Because the state's
evidence was purely circumstantial, the supreme court concluded that
Mitchell's credibility became the main issue before the jury. Conse-
quently, the improperly admitted character evidence alone may have
persuaded the jury of Mitchell's guilt. Thus, the court reasoned that
the outcome of the trial might have been different if the evidence had
been excluded." 0
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington"' set the standard for courts to apply in ineffective assis-
tance of counsel cases." Strickland requires the use of a two-prong test
to prove ineffective assistance. First, the defendant must show thait his
counsel's performance was deficient. Second, the defendant must show
that these deficiencies were prejudicial to his case." 2 The standard
used to measure counsel's deficiency is reasonable effectiveness or rea-
sonably competent assistance." 3 In making this determination, how-
ever, the Supreme Court warned that the scrutiny of counsel's actions
must be deferential, and that "every effort [should] be made to elimi-
nate the distorting effects of hindsight. .. .
105. Id. at 187, 379 S.E.2d at 124.
106. Id. at 188, 379 S.E.2d at 125 (citing State v. McElveen, 280 S.C. 325, 313 S.E.2d
298 (1984); State v. Swords, 279 S.C. 554, 309 S.E.2d 750 (1983); State v. Gamble, 247
S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966)).
107. Id. at 189, 379 S.E.2d at 125 (citing State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d
317 (1987)).
108. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
109. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
110. Mitchell, 298 S.C. at 189, 379 S.E.2d at 125.
111. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
112. Id. at 687.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 689.
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Ineffective assistance of counsel will not be found unless the sec-
ond prong, prejudice to the defendant, is proven. In addition to the
"reasonable probability" test cited by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Mitchell, the Strickland opinion emphasized the importance
of considering the trial's "fundamental fairness" to determine
prejudice to the defendant.115
The courts in recent South Carolina decisions have applied Strick-
land consistently. In Butler v. State"8 the defendant claimed ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel based on the attorney's failure to research
and present mitigating evidence. The supreme court relied on the
prejudice requirement of Strickland and refused to find ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. 17 In Roach v. Martin"8 the court declined to eval-
uate counsel's trial strategies and held that such an inquiry was im-
proper hindsight." 9 Thus, the courts seem less likely to find a counsel's
trial strategy deficient and prejudicial to the defendant than other
types of claims, presumably because of the court's deference to coun-
sel's actions in the courtroom.
Ineffective assistance of counsel appears easier to prove when 'the
error alleged is technical. In Watson v. State120 the court ruled that
counsel was ineffective because of his "failure to inform [the defend-
ant] that a jury could be impaneled to determine the propriety of a
recommendation of mercy on [his] burglary charge.""' The attorney
testified that he was not aware that the defendant was entitled to this
right. 22 The attorney's obvious technical error and its effect on the
outcome of the trial met both prongs of the Strickland test."23 In a
similar case, Stone v. State,"4 the court ruled that the defense attor-
ney's failure to request a jury instruction on self-defense constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Stone court based its first-prong
analysis on the fact that counsel did not request a charge because "it
did not cross his mind.""2 5 Because the error was technical, as in Wat-
son, the court found it to be objectionable under Strickland.
Two recent decisions address whether the failure to object consti-
tutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The failure to object arguably
115. See id. at 697.
116. 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094 (1986).
117. Id. at 443-45, 334 S.E.2d at 815-16.
118. 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
119. Id. at 1477.
120. 287 S.C. 356, 338 S.E.2d 636 (1985).
121. Id. at 357, 338 S.E.2d at 637.'
122. Id.
123. See id. at 357-58, 338 S.E.2d at 637-38.
124. 294 S.C. 286, 363 S.E.2d 903 (1988).
125. Id. at 287-88, 363 S.E.2d at 904.
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falls between an attorney's discretionary control over his trial strategy
and the objective technical errors proscribed by the rules of court. In
Jeffers v. Leeke"2 6 the Fourth Circuit found that the attorney's failure
to object to comments on the defendant's post-arrest silence was un-
reasonable.1 27 After further consideration, however, the court ruled
that the error was not prejudicial to the defendant because the attor-
ney had presented evidence that sufficiently explained the defendant's
silence.
128
In Sosebee v. Leeke,'129 however, the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that an attorney's failure to object ,to the trial judge's
opinionated comments constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court held that the attorney's error had prejudiced the client be-
cause the judge's comments had undermined a witnesses' credibility,
which was crucial to the clientY.3 0 In both Jeffers and Sosebee the
courts intimated that prejudice may depend in part upon the strength
and nature of the state's case. In both instances, however, the courts
identified and addressed both prongs of the Strickland test.
Although the outcome in Mitchell is in line with other South Car-
olina cases on ineffective assistance of counsel, the supreme court's rea-
soning in Mitchell is inconsistent with these cases.' 3 1 The Mitchell
court did not apply the first prong of the Strickland test to analyze the
deficiencies of the attorney at trial. Also, the court did not address the
second prong of the test. Instead of applying the two-prong analysis
the supreme court ruled that counsel's failure to object was an error
that constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. To support its find-
ing of error, the court cited case law which held that evidence of prior
bad acts was inadmissible. 32 The supreme court jumped from one end
of the Strickland analysis to the other and disregarded several logical
links in between. Thus, the court concluded that because counsel
erred, he necessarily was ineffective. The outcome in Mitchell is at
odds with the first-prong analysis in Strickland, which relies on a "rea-
sonable competence" standard to determine whether an attorney's er-
ror constitutes ineffectiveness of counsel. 33 The Strickland test does
not state that error equals ineffectiveness. Furthermore, the Strickland
opinion states that to satisfy the first prong, a defendant must show
126. 835 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988).
127. Id. at 525 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).
128. Id. at 526.
129. 293 S.C. 531, 362 S.E.2d 22 (1987).
130. Id. at 535, 362 S.E.2d at 24.
131. See Jeffers v. Leeke, 835 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008
(1988); Sosebee v. Leeke, 293 S.C. 531, 362 S.E.2d 22 (1987).
132. Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 189, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (per curiam).
133. 466 U.S. at 687.
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"that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment." 134 The Strickland decision does not suggest that every error re-
sults in ineffective counsel. The Mitchell court returned to the Strick-
land analysis when it applied the "reasonable probability" test to
determine the error's prejudicial effects on the defendant.135 The court
focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case as a key
factor. The court, therefore, held that counsel's failure to object to the
damaging character evidence was particularly prejudicial because the
state's purely circumstantial case put the defendant's credibility into
issue. Thus, the court clarified a standard of analysis to determine
prejudice that never had been enunciated."' To determine the prejudi-
cial effect of an error, the Supreme Court in Strickland ruled that
courts "must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or
jury. . . . [A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the rec-
ord is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with over-
whelming record support.
M 7
The Mitchell court's decision not to articulate the Strickland test
leaves unanswered the question whether the court intends to abandon
the first prong of the Strickland test. If so, any error by counsel stands
to be labelled as ineffective assistance of counsel if it is based on a
near-perfect standard of peformance. Furthermore, countless ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cases will flood an already overwhelmed judi-
cial system. The Mitchell opinion in effect has created a demand for
perfection in criminal cases that the Supreme Court sought to amelio-
rate when it designed the prejudice prong of Strickland. In fact, the
Strickland court's standard was a requirement for "reasonably compe-
tent counsel," not nearly perfect counsel.
Although the Mitchell court did not address the first prong of
Strickland, the court's consideration of the relative strength of the
state's case to determine the prejudicial effect of counsel's error set
forth a practical guideline that will be valuable in reviewing future in-
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. 298 S.C. at 189, 379 S.E.2d at 125.
136. In several South Carolina cases the courts appear to have based their findings
of prejudice in part on the strength or weakness of the state's case, but the courts never
clearly stated this as a consideration. See Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) (counsel's failure to develop certain defenses was not preju-
dicial because of state's strong case); Stone v. State, 294 S.C. 286, 363 S.E.2d 903 (1988)
(counsel's failure to request jury instruction prejudicial). For a case in which the court
considered the strength of the defendant's case as a factor, see Jeffers v. Leeke, 835 F.2d
522 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988) (comments of state's counsel not
prejudicial because of defendant's strong evidence that rebutted the comments).
137. 466 U.S. at 695-96.
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effective assistance of counsel cases.
Kelley M. Braithwaite
V. TRIAL iN ABsENTA REQUIRES PROPER NOTICE OF ALL CHARGES
In State v. Goode'38 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether the state may prosecute a defendant in absentia for two sepa-
rate crimes when the defendant had notice of only one crime. The
court upheld the criminal conviction for which the state gave the de-
fendant notice and reversed the second conviction for which the state
did not give the defendant notice." 9
Law enforcement officials arrested James F. Goode in May 1987
for breaking into a motor vehicle. The court released him on a $5,000
surety bond and ordered him to appear in court on June 15, 1987.
Goode failed to appear on June 15 and the court indicted him for
grand larceny and breaking into a motor vehicle. On December 9, 1987,
the court tried Goode in absentia and found him guilty of both
charges. He was not represented by counsel.
1 40
The trial judge gave Goode a ten-year sentence for the grand lar-
ceny offense and a five-year consecutive sentence for the crime of
breaking into a motor vehicle. On appeal the supreme court upheld the
conviction for breaking into the motor vehicle, but reversed Goode's
conviction for grand larceny. The court noted that the surety bond
provided Goode with notice of only the charge of breaking into the
motor vehicle and, therefore, Goode did not knowingly and voluntarily
waive his right to be present on the grand larceny charge. 41
The supreme court's opinion in Goode is significant for two rea-
sons. First, when the court upheld one of Goode's convictions, it ap-
proved the practice of in absentia criminal convictions in South Caro-
lina. Second, when the court overturned Goode's grand larceny
conviction for lack of notice, it confirmed the notice requirement as a
limitation on in absentia trials.
The court refused to convict Goode for grand larceny and observed
that the state "failed to prove that Goode had any notice, either actual
or constructive, as to his indictment for grand larceny or the subse-
quent trial which commenced several months after Goode was released
on the surety bond .... ,12 Furthermore, the court stated that
138. 299 S.C. 479, 385 S.E.2d 844 (1989).
139. Id. at 483, 385 S.E.2d at 846.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 482, 385 S.E.2d at 845.
142. Id., 385 S.E.2d at 846.
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"Goode had no warning that he faced prosecution for [grand larceny]
. ..only that he would be prosecuted for breaking into a motor vehi-
cle."'1 4 3 The court's ruling in Goode follows South Carolina prece-
dent.144 Moreover, the right to reasonable notice of charges is guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
14 5
which applies to state criminal prosecutions under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 146 This right is also guaranteed under the South Carolina
Constitution. 47 The United States Supreme Court has held that the
right to reasonable notice of criminal charges is a basic element of the
accused's Sixth Amendment rights." 8
In Goode the state's attorneys relied on Ellis v. State 49 to support
their argument that Goode did not have the right to set the time or
circumstances of his trial on either charge.150 In Ellis the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that if the defendant has notice of the term
of court in which he will be tried and elects to waive his right to appear
at trial, that waiver is sufficient.' 51 In Ellis the defendant knew of the
charges against him and fled the state to avoid the trial.1 52 The su-
preme court in Goode distinguished Ellis because the state failed to
prove that Goode had any notice of the grand larceny charge when he
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., State v. Green, 269 S.C. 657, 239 S.E.2d 485 (1977) (state violated the
defendant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations
against him when the state did not issue an arrest warrant or indictment and did not
arraign him on the charge, and furthermore, no legal official of the state advised him of
the charge). The Goode court quoted from Green: "'[A] valid waiver [of an accused per-
son's right to be present at trial] presupposes notice to the accused. Without notice of
the charges, the accused cannot be deemed to have made a "knowing" and "voluntary"
election to be absent.'" State v. Goode, 299 S.C. 479, 482, 385 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1989)
(quoting Green, 269 S.C. at 662, 239 S.E.2d at 487).
145. The Sixth Amendment pzovides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right. . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
[and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
146. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
147. The South Carolina Constitution provides that "[a]ny person charged with an
offense shall enjoy the right ... to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation . . . ." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14.
148. See, e.g., 21A Am. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 640 (reasonable notice of charges is a
basic element of due process); see also Farefta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975)
(The accused has the right to make his own defense personally, and this Sixth Amend-
ment right does not belong to his counsel. The accused, therefore, must be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-34 (1967) (juvenile
custody hearing; court held that notice must be given sufficiently in advance of court
proceedings and it must set forth the alleged conduct with particularity).
149. 267 S.C. 257, 227 S.E.2d 304 (1976).
150. State v. Goode, 299 S.C. 479, 482, 385 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1989).
151. 267 S.C. at 260-61, 227 S.E.2d at 305-06.
152. Id. at 259, 227 S.E.2d at 305.
1990]
19
Hammond et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
waived his right to be present at trial.153
Although Goode was not present at the trial, the supreme court
upheld his conviction for breaking into a motor vehicle."" The South
Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure (SCRCP) govern trials in absen-
tia. SCRCP Rule 16 provides that a person "may voluntarily waive his
right to be present [at trial] and may be tried in his absence upon a
finding by the court that such person has received notice of his right to
be present .... ,,15 South Carolina courts have held that a trial court
must be reversed if no record exists in which the trial judge made a
finding of fact that the defendant had been given notice that he would
be tried in absentia if he failed to appear. 6 Appellate courts also will
reverse a judgment if the trial judge made the requisite finding of fact
as to notice, but the findings were without evidentiary support. 57 The
supreme court upheld the motor vehicle conviction in Goode because
they found that the trial judge had made a valid evidentiary finding
that Goode was put on notice.158 To claim protection of the court's rule
that requires notice of trial, either the defendant or the criminal de-
fense attorney must object at the first opportunity and ask that an
evidentiary finding of notice be made before the defendant is tried in
absentia.'
153. Goode, 299 S.C. at 482, 385 S.E.2d at 846.
154. Id. at 483, 385 S.E.2d at 846.
155. S.C.R. CraM. P. 16. Rule 16 provides:
[E]xcept in cases wherein capital punishment is a permissible sentence, a per-
son indicted for misdemeanors and/or felonies may voluntarily waive his right
to be present and may be tried in his absence upon a finding by the court that
such person has received notice of his right to be present and that a warning
was given that the trial would proceed in his absence upon a failure to attend
the court.
For a discussion of the capital punishment exception, see Cohen, Can They Kill Me If
I'm Gone: Trial in Absentia in Capital Cases, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 273 (1984) (If capital
defendant escapes before trial and remains absent through sentencing, trial in absentia
probably barred). See also Cohen, Trial in Absentia Re-Examined, 40 TENN. L. REv. 155
(1973) (in some in absentia trial, defendant's rights may be adequately represented by
counsel).
156. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 290 S.C. 435, 351 S.E.2d 167 (1986) (record did not
support finding that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to be pre-
sent); State v. Jackson, 288 S.C. 94, 341 S.E.2d 375 (1986) (error for trial judge not to
make finding of fact as to defendant's notice before trial in absentia); State v. Simmons,
279 S.C. 165, 303 S.E.2d 857 (1983) (record failed to show notice of indictment trial);
State v. Fleming, 287 S.C. 268, 335 S.E.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1985) (error for trial judge not
to make finding of fact as to notice before trial in absentia).
157. See, e.g., State v. Simmons, 279 S.C. 165, 303 S.E.2d 857 (1983).
158. Goode, 299 S.C. at 483, 385 S.E.2d at 846.
159. State v. Williams, 292 S.C. 231, 355 S.E.2d 861 (1987) (defendant appeared a
day late for his trial, but neither defendant nor his attorney objected to the court pro-
ceeding without defendant being present).
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The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) have stricter
standards for allowing trials in absentia than the standards set forth in
rule 16 of the SCRCP. FRCP rule 43 provides that "[t]he defendant
shall be present at. . .every stage of the trial. . . except as otherwise
-provided . , . and the defendant shall be considered to have waived
the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present . . . is
voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced whether or not the
defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain
during the trial ... .,,16o Accordingly, under the FRCP the defendant
must be present at a minimum during the initial stages of trial before
he may waive his right to be present.
In United States v. Tortora,'16 a case with multiple defendants,
the Second Circuit held that it is within the trial judge's discretion to
proceed in absentia if the court finds that the defendant had notice of
the charge even if the defendant failed to appear as required by the
federal rules. The Tortora court also noted that "[i]t is difficult. . . to
conceive of any case where the exercise of this discretion would be ap-
propriate other than a multiple-defendant case." 162 In Tortora the trial
court had proceeded with a trial that was plagued with scheduling dif-
ficulties even though one of the defendants knowingly and voluntarily
'had failed to appear after pleading not guilty and being released on
bond. The defendant was convicted in absentia.163 On appeal the Sec-
ond Circuit upheld the conviction despite the appellant's argument
that rule 43 mandated a reversal. The Second Circuit emphasized that
defendants may be tried in absentia at the trial judge's discretion
when circumstances such as those in Tortora warrant the
proceeding.1
64
The rules governing trials in absentia vary among the states. Some
states protect defendants by allowing a trial in absentia if the charge is
a misdemeanor and the defendant is represented by counsel.165 One
state has upheld an in absentia conviction, however, even though the
defendant received no actual notice of his trial date.'66
160. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
161. 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
162. Id. at 1210 n.7.
163. Id. at 1204-07.
164. Id. at 1210; note that rule 43(c)(2) of the FRCP allows in absentia trials when
defendants are charged with an offense that is "punishable by fine or by imprisonment
for not more than one year or both so long as the court proceeds with "the written con-
sent of the defendant .... .
165. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 99 Or. App. 176, 781 P.2d 404 (1989) (Oregon statute
allowed trial in absentia for misdemeanor and defendant had to be present when repre-
sented by counsel for felony).
166. State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989) (notice to attorney sufficient be-
cause defendant has duty to keep in touch with attorney).
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The substantial authority which requires that reasonable notice be
given to a defendant of all charges brought against him compelled the
South Carolina Supreme Court's decision on Goode's grand larceny
conviction. By upholding Goode's conviction for breaking into a motor
vehicle, the court acted within constitutional boundaries and, at the
same time, affirmed a sound policy that thwarts defendants who other-
wise "could frustrate the speedy satisfaction of justice by absenting





VI. THE RAPE SHIELD PROVISION: AN EXCLUSION FOR MOTIVE AND
BIAS
In State v. Finley6 8 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the trial court misapplied the Rape Shield Provision 6 ' when it refused
to allow a defendant to testify about the complainant's prior sexual
conduct with a third party.17 0 The supreme court's opinion in Finley
narrows the scope of the Rape Shield Provision to allow a criminal de-
fendant to introduce evidence of the complainant's sexual behavior
when it relates to the complainant's possible motives and biases in
bringing the charge.
In Finley the complainant's allegations arose from events that fol-
lowed a dinner date whereupon the defendant and complainant slept
separately in the living room of the complainant's apartment. During
the night, the defendant awoke and saw the complainant and her
neighbor engaged in sexual intercourse. When the neighbor left, the
complainant and the defendant went back to sleep without discussing
the incident. The complainant alleged that when she told the defend-
ant to leave her apartment the next morning, he physically assaulted
her and attempted to rape her. The defendant argued that he did not
physically assault the complainant, but admitted that they did quarrel
over the complainant's sexual conduct with her neighbor. The defend-
167. United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
168. 300 S.C. 196, 387 S.E.2d 88 (1989). The supreme court also held that the trial
court erred when it refused to admit into evidence a tape recorded conversation offered
by the defendant to impeach the complainant's testimony. The court noted that "even
illegally obtained evidence is generally admissable for impeachment purposes." Id. at
199, 337 S.E.2d at 89 (citing State v. Mercado, 263 S.C. 304, 210 S.E.2d 459 (1974)).
169. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The Rape Shield Provision is
part of the Criminal'Sexual Conduct Act. Id. §§ 16-3-651 to -740 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1989).
170. Finley, 300 S.C. at 200, 387 S.E.2d at 90.
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,ant also contended that the complainant falsely accused him of rape
because she was angry and feared that he would tell others of her sex-
ual conduct with her neighbor.
1 7 1
At trial the complainant testified that the defendant had offered
to pay her $1000 to drop the charges. The defendant's girlfriend testi-
fied, however, that the complainant originally made the $1000 offer to
drop the charges. The defendant offered evidence of a tape recorded
conversation in which the complainant, in fact, offered to drop the
charges. The trial court refused to admit the taped conversation be-
cause it was "irrelevant and improper. '17 2 The supreme court ruled
that the tape should have been admitted, reversed the trial court, and
remanded the case.
73
The South Carolina Rape Shield Provision states that "[e]vidence
of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct . . . and reputation
evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be admitted in prose-
cutions .. .", 7 The Provision contains three exceptions to allow the
admission of (1) evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the
defendant, (2) "evidence of specific instances of sexual activity with
persons other than defendant introduced to show source or origin of
semen, pregnancy or disease about which evidence has been previously
introduced. . .[provided] its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does
not outweigh its probative value . . . . 175 and (3) evidence of adultery
that a defendant offers to impeach the credibility of the witness.1 7 6 The
Provision does not state expressly any exception for evidence that may
relate to a victim's motive or bias in bringing the charges. Because evi-
dence that relates to the motive or bias of the prosecuting witness may
be essential to a defendant's constitutional right to confront the wit-
nesses against him and to present his defense, many courts have con-
sidered statutes similar to the Rape Shield Provision overinclusive in
their scope.1
77
171. Id. at 198, 387 S.E.2d at 89.
172. Id. at 199, 387 S.E.2d at 89.
173. Id., 387 S.E.2d at 89-90.
174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Latzer v. Abrams, 602 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (court
ruled that trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination of witnesses because of New
York's rape shield statute violated the defendant's constitutional confrontation rights);
Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 231, 415 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1981) (court must
allow testimony that complainant had been charged twice with prostitution to prove that
she was motivated falsely to accuse the defendant of rape by her desire to avoid further
prosecution); People v. Sloviuski, 166 Mich. App. 158, 182-83, 420 N.W.2d 145, 155
(1988) (evidence of complainant's prostitution admissable to protect rape defendant's
due process and confrontation rights).
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Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence generally "bars reputa-
tion and opinion evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct, but per-
mits evidence of specific incidents" if the constitution mandates ad-
mission. 178 Prior to the adoption of rule 412 in 1978, many federal and
state courts treated rape victims harshly and unsympathetically. 179 The
victim's reputation and past sexual conduct were proper subjects of in-
quiry during a rape trial."'0
Although almost all states have enacted rape shield statutes""' and
many courts have addressed the scope of admissible evidence at rape
trials in these states, the United States Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed directly the issue of admitting evidence of a victim's motive or
bias. The Court, however, has suggested the direction it is likely to
take. In Davis v. Alaska1s2 the Court addressed a criminal defendant's
right to confront and cross-examine a crucial prosecution witness about
the witness' juvenile court probation. The defendant hoped to prove
the possible bias of the witness because of his probationary status. The
state argued that the defendant should not reveal the witness' past
probation, and the trial court agreed because of the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The Court held that the defendant was entitled
to introduce evidence of possible bias on the part of a key prosecuting
witness.18 3 The trial court refused to allow the testimony because of
state provisions protecting juvenile offenders. The Supreme Court,
however, held that without the opportunity to cross-examine and at-
tack a witness' credibility to reveal possible biases or ulterior motives,
a defendant cannot be guaranteed a fair and impartial trial in accor-
dance with the Sixth Amendment."8 Based on its reasoning in the Da-
vis opinion, the Court might extend a similar rationale to protect a
defendant that has been accused of rape.
Several courts have relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Davis to admit a complainant's previous sexual conduct as evidence of
motive or bias. In State v. JaJo'8 5 the Oregon Court of Appeals held
that the trial court should have allowed a defendant charged with rape
178. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (dis-
cussing rule 412(b)(1)); see, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation guarantees the defendant's right to cross-examination
in criminal proceedings).
179. For an historical overview of the rape victim's treatment in rape cases, see Ber-
ger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1977).
180. See 1A J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 (1983).
181. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 178, at 573 n.11.
182. 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (per curiam).
183. Id. at 319-20.
184. Id. at 316-17.
185. 27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976).
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to introduce evidence that the alleged victim brought the charges be-
cause she feared that he would tell her parents of her sexual conduct
with the defendant's son. Oregon's rape shield law precluded evidence
of previous sexual conduct.188 The court ruled the statute unconstitu-
tional and stated that if a court prohibited the evidence it would in-
fringe upon the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation and
found that "the only difference between Davis and this case is that the
policy of [the Oregon statute] is to protect a sex-crime complaint.' 187
In Commonwealth v. Black 88 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
relied on Davis to support its holding that the Pennsylvania Rape
Shield Statute could not prevent a defendant from introducing evi-
dence of the victim's bias because of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights.' 8 The Pennsylvania court noted "[w]e can not distinguish the
present case from Davis v. Alaska. . . and therefore are constrained to
reverse .... "90
In Summit v. Nevada'9' the defendant was charged with assault-
ing a six-year-old child. The Nevada Supreme Court permitted the de-
fendant to introduce testimony that the child knew about similar sex-
ual acts and, therefore, was able to fabricate the charges. The Nevada
court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Davis and allowed the de-
fendant to introduce the evidence because it was not intended solely to
impeach or injure the child but to dispel the jury's inference that the
child could not otherwise know about sex.'9 2 Jalo, Black, and Summit
are examples of several courts' willingness to allow the admission of
motive and bias evidence in rape cases even when rape shield statutes
are in force.
In State v. McCoy's3 the defendant challenged the constitutional-
ity of South Carolina's Rape Shield Provision because it limited his
right to introduce evidence and his right to confront witnesses.' 9 ' The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the rape shield provision was
constitutional because it did not prohibit introduction of all the evi-
dence of a victim's past sexual conduct. In upholding the statute, the
court stated that judges should apply the statute's restrictions in such
a way that the interests of society and the prosecuting witness are bal-
186. Id. at 850, 557 P.2d at 1362.
187. Id. at 850-51, 557 P.2d at 1362.
188. 337 Pa. Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985).
189. Id. at 555-57, 487 A.2d at 400.
190. Id. at 556, 487 A.2d at 400.
191. 101 Nev. 159, 697 P.2d 1374 (1985).
192. Id. at 162, 697 P.2d at 1376.
193. 274 S.C. 70, 261 S.E.2d 159 (1979).
194. Id. at 72, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
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anced against the interests of the defendants that are charged.195
In Finley the South Carolina Supreme Court used State v.
Schmidt01 1 as an example of a case in which evidence of previous sex-
ual behavior had considerable probative value relating to the motive or
bias of the complaining witness.19 7 In Schmidt the defendant was con-
victed of criminal sexual conduct with a minor. Two years had elapsed
between the alleged assault and the child's first report of it, and the
trial court refused to allow the defendant to introduce evidence of a
"vendetta" which stemmed from his extramarital affair with the child's
mother.198 The supreme court held that the evidence relating to motive
and bias was relevant and that to refuse such testimony would deny
the defendant a fair and impartial trial. 99
Although almost all states have enacted rape shield statutes, the
statutes vary in their sensitivity to the issue of motive and bias.
200
South Carolina's Rape Shield Provision appears overinclusive because
it does not contain language similar to Federal Rule 412(b)(1). 0 1 The
court's decision in Finley refines the holding of McCoy by considering
the state's interest in protecting the victim, while affirming the defend-
ant's constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses as
part of the defense. In Finley the defendant denied committing an as-
sault and argued that the victim fabricated the charges to extort
money from him. The court emphasized the unique facts of the Finley
case and ruled that testimony which concerned the complainant's sex-
ual conduct was relevant to establish evidence of her motive, bias, and
prejudice. The court warned, however, that its opinion in Finley
should not weaken the rape shield statute's application to general char-
acter or reputation testimony.
20 2
In Finley the supreme court emphasized the distinction between
evidence introduced to prove a victim's motive and bias and evidence
of the victim's past sexual behavior introduced solely to prove general
reputation and character.20 3 In recent years, courts have devoted more
attention to trying rape cases in ways that do not degrade and humili-
195. Id. at 73, 261 S.E.2d at 161.
196. 288 S.C. 301, 342 S.E.2d 401 (1986).
197. Finley, 300 S.C. at 200, 387 S.E.2d at 90.
198. Schmidt, 288 S.C. at 302, 342 S.E.2d at 402.
199. Id. at 303, 342 S.E.2d at 403.
200. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 591 (1980) (comparative tables of rape shield statutes).
201. For a discussion of the Rape Shield Act as overinclusive, see Case Comment,
Rape Reform in South Carolina, 30 S.C.L. REv. 45, 61-68 (1979).
202. State v. Finley, 300 S.C. 196, 201, 387 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1989).
263. Id. at 200, 387 S.E.2d at 90.
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ate the victim. 20 4 The state's interest in protecting a victim's past is
certainly worthwhile. Nevertheless, courts cannot ignore defendants'
constitutional rights. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Finley has
established a good balance between the state's interest in protecting
the rape victim and the defendant's right to present a-defense.
Lucinda Gardner Wichmann
204. Berger, supra note 179. See also Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State
and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MhNN. L. REv. 763 (1986);
Winters, United States v. Shaw: What Constitutes an "Injury" Under the Federal Rape
Shield Statute?, 43 U. MIhIm L. REv. 947, 951-66 (1989).
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